It draws on the initiatives for Better Regulation promoted by both organisations over the last few years. Conclusions Review the way in which the Better Regulation is presented within the administration, drawing out more clearly the potential links with the agenda for post crisis recovery. Review the scope and balance of the current Better Regulation initiatives.
Blog Post Brexit and competition policy in Europe If the UK leaves the EU without any agreement in place, this could change the way that competition law is applied. It could also make antitrust cases more costly and competition policy instruments less effective.
July 6, Topic: The EEA agreement establishes a dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area, based on common rules and equal conditions of competition. It would mean that that two separate legal systems would be applied in parallel within the EEA.
Common laws are applicable whenever trade between EU member states is affected. In merger cases the European Commission has exclusive jurisdiction in the EEA to deal with all cases that have a community dimension.
However, the UK would lose its ability to directly influence future developments of EU competition law. A second option would be a series of bilateral trade agreements that allow partial access to the single market under conditions that do not require the full adoption of EU competition law, as in Switzerland.
But the Swiss example illustrates the close collaboration of competition authorities that such trade agreements involve. A cooperation agreement on competition matters between the EU and Switzerland was signed inproviding a framework for coordination on enforcement of competition, and strengthening cooperation in the fight against breaches of competition law.
A third option is full Brexit an exit from the EU without any agreement in place. This would drive Britain out of all EU treaties and may change the way that competition law is applied.
I will focus on its potential impact in the rest of this article. Current UK competition rules are largely modeled on the equivalent EU rules. It is unlikely that there will be a major change in the near future, as the UK is expected to continue relying on the Competition Act ofgiven the traditional British view that free markets and undistorted competition are the best way to ensure efficient allocation of resources.
With EU law no longer being superior, any decisions taken in Brussels would no longer have a binding effect in the UK. Two parallel systems of enforcement would end the one stop shop principle for EU merger regulation and other antitrust offences, under which each investigation was carried out by a single authority.
If there is a separation, in merger cases where firms have considerable market share both in the UK and in one or more EU member states, the CMA would open an investigation simultaneously and independently from EU competition authorities. This duplication would increase administrative costs for companies.
It could make the investigation process take longer, which would make merger cases more difficult. It would also raise uncertainty, and risk conflicting views and arguments between the two authorities. If, for example, the CMA clears a proposed merger, but, the European Commission finds that it undermines competition in the EU market, then the merging firms have two options.
Either they merge, but exit the EU market as they do not have permission to operate as a merged entity in the EU area, or they do not merge and they continue their operations as two separate entities in both markets.
The same applies if EU authorities impose specific remedies that need to be fulfilled. The double investigation would likely mean that some offenders would have to pay any cartel fines twice. It may also make leniency programmes less effective. Such programmes have proven an effective tool to fight cartels.
Under leniency programmes, the whistleblower-firm receives amnesty and does not pay the antitrust fine imposed by the authority on other cartel participants.
This means it has an incentive to come forward and report the existence of the cartel. But, if there are separate competition authorities, a whistleblower from a cartel operating both in the UK and the EU may not have incentives to report its existence to the one authority, if that means that the cartel will also be revealed to the other authority, which could run a separate prosecution and apply fines even to that firm.
In this case, full amnesty could only be achieved if the whistleblower applies for leniency in both competition policy regimes another costly duplication that may be put in place after Brexit. In private antitrust enforcement and in particular in private damages cases, the UK is often the jurisdiction of choice by claimants Oxera — according to EU law, claimants can often choose the jurisdiction for their damage claims.
It reportedly has several advantages in comparison to the EU Flett, Many damage claims in the UK follow on from Commission decisions and any associated hearings at EU courts. If there is a full Brexit, there will be some ambiguity about whether such decisions apply to UK courts.
It may become necessary to bring two separate cases one for the UK, and one for the EU to claim damages for the European market. That could substantially increase the costs of bringing the case and may discourage the claimants to proceed with cases on damages.
Full Brexit is likely to mean that the UK would be outside the state aid control system. The UK government would have greater liberty to give aid to UK businesses.
It would also have more freedom to grant preferential tax treatment to international companies. But, on the other hand, the UK would lose influence on the state aid decisions implemented in EU member states, which may concern firms that are also active in the UK market.
Developed coordination between the two sides would be necessary to avoid state-aid policies that distort competition and introduce inefficiencies in the product market.
Alternatively, EU authorities may choose to limit market access to companies that have received significant state aid.Margrethe Vestager, the EU's competition commissioner, has distributed a page judgment on Apple's Ireland operations, the Financial Times reports, ahead of an official ruling on Apple's tax.
Category: Competition policy It’s just over a week since Commissioner Vestager announced the state-aid ruling on the tax treatment of Apple in Ireland.
calculation of the taxable profit allocated to the Irish branches of Apple Sales International and of Apple Operations Europe;. european commission - Speeches and articles about General Policy. Introduction Ireland is an island on the western fringe of Europe between latitude 51 1/2 and 55 1/2 degrees north, and longitude 5 1/2 to 10 1/2 degrees west.
Aug 26, · Knock, in County Mayo in the west of Ireland, has served as an engine of faith for the Catholic Church since , when a group of townspeople reported seeing apparitions of the Virgin Mary and.
Ireland: Generation apprenticeship competition A key part of Ireland’s National skills strategy and action plans for education is the expansion of the apprenticeship system, with the aim to increase substantially the number of new apprentices by